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ABSTRACT
Feature Squeezing is a recently proposed defense method which reduces the search
space available to an adversary by coalescing samples that correspond to many
different feature vectors in the original space into a single sample. It has been
shown that feature squeezing defenses can be combined in a joint detection frame-
work to achieve high detection rates against state-of-the-art attacks. However, we
demonstrate on the MNIST and CIFAR-10 datasets that by increasing the adversary
strength of said state-of-the-art attacks, one can bypass the detection framework
with adversarial examples of minimal visual distortion. These results suggest for
proposed defenses to validate against stronger attack configurations.
1 INTRODUCTION
Deep neural networks (DNNs) achieve state-of-the-art performance in various tasks in machine learn-
ing and artificial intelligence, such as image classification, speech recognition, machine translation
and game-playing. Despite their effectiveness, recent studies have illustrated the vulnerability of
DNNs to adversarial examples Szegedy et al. (2013); Goodfellow et al. (2015). For instance, a
carefully designed perturbation to an image can lead a well-trained DNN to misclassify. Even worse,
effective adversarial examples can also be made virtually indistinguishable to human perception.
Adversarial examples crafted to evade a specific model can even be used to mislead other models
trained for the same task, exhibiting a property known as transferability Liu et al. (2016); Papernot
et al. (2016); Sharma & Chen (2017).
To address this problem, numerous defense mechanisms have been proposed; one which has achieved
strong results is feature squeezing. Feature squeezing relies on applying input transformations
to reduce the degrees of freedom available to an adversary by “squeezing” out unnecessary input
features. The authors in Xu et al. (2017) propose a detection method using such input transformations
by relying on the intuition that if the original and squeezed inputs produce substantially different
outputs from the model, the input is likely to be adversarial. By comparing the difference between
predictions with a selected threshold value, the system is designed to output the correct prediction
for legitimate examples and reject adversarial inputs. By combining multiple squeezers in a joint
detection framework, the authors claim that the system can can successfully detect adversarial
examples from eleven state-of-the-art methods Xu et al. (2017).
In this paper, we show that by increasing the adversary strength of the state-of-the-art methods, the
feature squeezing joint detection method can be readily bypassed. We demonstrate this on both the
MNIST and CIFAR-10 datasets. We experiment with EAD Chen et al. (2017), a generalization of
the state-of-the-art C&W L2 attack Carlini & Wagner (2017), and I-FGSM Kurakin et al. (2016),
an iterative version of the often used fast gradient L∞ attack Goodfellow et al. (2015). For EAD,
and C&W, we increase the adversary strength by increasing κ, which controls the necessary margin
between the predicted probability of the target class and that of the rest. For I-FGSM, we increase
the adversary strength by increasing , which controls the allowable L∞ distortion. We find that
adversarial examples with minimal visual distortion can be generated which bypass feature squeezing
under these stronger attack configurations. Our results suggest that proposed defenses should
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Table 1: Comparison of I-FGSM, C&W, and EAD results against the MNIST joint detector at various
confidence levels. ASR means attack success rate (%). The distortion metrics are averaged over
successful examples.
Non-Targeted Targeted
Next LL
Attack Method Confidence ASR L1 L2 L∞ ASR L1 L2 L∞ ASR L1 L2 L∞
I-FGSM None 100% 196.0 10.17 0.900 78% 169.8 8.225 0.881 67% 188.1 9.091 0.991
C&W
10 0% 21.05 1.962 0.568 0% 31.94 2.748 0.655 0% 37.78 3.207 0.732
20 15% 27,21 2.472 0.665 10% 40.51 3.419 0.763 24% 47.86 3.977 0.820
30 64% 34.30 3.019 0.754 67% 47.43 3.973 0.842 91% 59.56 4.811 0.888
40 87% 42.04 3.590 0.831 97% 61.12 4.938 0.922 100% 72.88 5.715 0.939
EAD
10 24% 11.44 2.286 0.879 7% 19.69 3.114 0.942 7% 23.99 3.481 0.955
20 80% 15.26 2.766 0.921 65% 26.80 3.752 0.964 78% 31.81 4.122 0.972
30 95% 20.17 3.264 0.957 97% 35.50 4.449 0.983 93% 39.68 4.769 0.991
40 97% 26.50 3.803 0.972 100% 44.75 5.114 0.992 100% 50.21 5.532 0.997
Table 2: Comparison of I-FGSM, C&W, and EAD results against the CIFAR-10 joint detector at
various confidence levels. ASR means attack success rate (%). The distortion metrics are averaged
over successful examples.
Non-Targeted Targeted
Next LL
Attack Method Confidence ASR L1 L2 L∞ ASR L1 L2 L∞ ASR L1 L2 L∞
I-FGSM None 100% 81.18 1.833 0.070 100% 212.0 4.979 0.299 100% 214.9 5.042 0.300
C&W
10 32% 10.51 0.274 0.033 0% 14.25 0.368 0.042 0% 17.36 0.445 0.049
30 78% 28.80 0.712 0.073 51% 37.11 0.901 0.083 6% 41.51 1.006 0.093
50 96% 59.32 1.416 0.130 98% 82.54 1.954 0.169 94% 90.17 2.129 0.179
70 100% 120.2 2.827 0.243 100% 201.2 4.713 0.375 100% 212.2 4.962 0.403
EAD
10 46% 6.371 0.379 0.079 10% 8.187 0.508 0.109 0% 10.17 0.597 0.121
30 78% 18.94 0.876 0.146 51% 25.98 1.090 0.166 23% 29.58 1.209 0.175
50 94% 42.36 1.550 0.206 96% 62.90 2.094 0.247 90% 70.23 2.296 0.275
70 100% 83.14 2.670 0.317 100% 157.9 4.466 0.477 100% 172.8 4.811 0.502
validate against adversarial examples of maximal distortion, as long as the examples remain visually
adversarial.
2 EXPERIMENT SETUP
Two types of feature squeezing were focused on by the authors in Xu et al. (2017): (i) reducing
the color bit depth of images; and (ii) using smoothing (both local and non-local) to reduce the
variation among pixels. For the detection method, the model’s original prediction is compared with
the prediction on the squeezed sample using the L1 norm. As a defender typically does not know the
exact attack method, multiple feature squeezers are combined by outputting the maximum distance.
The threshold is selected targeting a false positive rate below 5% by choosing a threshold that is
exceeded by no more than 5% of legitimate samples.
For MNIST, the joint detector consists of a 1-bit depth squeezer with 2x2 median smoothing. For
CIFAR-10, the joint detector consists of a 5-bit depth squeezer with 2x2 median smoothing and a
non-local means filter with a 13x13 search window, 3x3 patch size, and a Gaussian kernel bandwidth
size of 2. We use the same thresholds as used in Xu et al. (2017). We generate adversarial examples
using the EAD Chen et al. (2017) and I-FGSM attacks Kurakin et al. (2016).
EAD generalizes the state-of-the-art C&W L2 attack Carlini & Wagner (2017) by performing elastic-
net regularization, linearly combining the L1 and L2 penalty functions Chen et al. (2017). The
hyperparameter β controls the trade-off between L1 and L2 minimization. We test EAD in both the
general case and the special case where β is set to 0, which is equivalent to the C&W L2 attack. For
MNIST and CIFAR-10, β was set to 0.01 and 0.001, respectively. We tune κ, which is a confidence
parameter that controls the necessary margin between the predicted probability of the target class and
that of the rest, in our experiments. κ is increased starting from 10 on both datasets, which was the
value used in the feature squeezing experiments Xu et al. (2017). Full detail on the implementation is
provided in the supplementary material.
For L∞ attacks, which we will consider, fast gradient methods (FGM) use the sign of the gradient
∇J of the training loss J with respect to the input for crafting adversarial examples Goodfellow et al.
2
Workshop track - ICLR 2018
Figure 1: Randomly selected set of non-
targeted MNIST adversarial examples gener-
ated by EAD. First row: Original, Subsequent
rows: κ = {10, 20, 30}.
Figure 2: Randomly selected set of non-
targeted CIFAR-10 adversarial examples gen-
erated by EAD. First row: Original, Subse-
quent rows: κ = {10, 30, 50}.
(2015). I-FGSM iteratively uses FGM with a finer distortion, followed by an -ball clipping Kurakin
et al. (2016). We tune , which controls the allowable L∞ distortion, in our experiments.  is
increased starting from 0.3 on MNIST and 0.008 on CIFAR-10, which were the values used for the
feature squeezing experiments Xu et al. (2017). Full detail on the implementation is provided in the
supplementary material.
We randomly sample 100 images from the MNIST and CIFAR-10 test sets. For each dataset, we
use the same pre-trained state-of-the-art models as used in Xu et al. (2017). We generate adversarial
examples in the non-targeted case, force network to misclassify, and in the targeted case, force
network to misclassify to a target class t. As done in Xu et al. (2017), we try two different targets, the
Next class (t = label + 1 mod # of classes) and the least-likely class (LL).
3 EXPERIMENT RESULTS
The generated adversarial examples are tested against the proposed MNIST and CIFAR-10 joint
detection configurations. In Tables 1 and 2, the results of tuning κ for C&W and EAD are provided,
and are presented with the results for I-FGSM at the lowest  value at which the highest attack
success rate (ASR) was yielded, against the MNIST and CIFAR-10 joint detectors, respectively. In all
cases, EAD outperforms the C&W L2 attack, particularly at lower confidence levels, indicating the
importance of minimizing the L1 distortion for generating robust adversarial examples with minimal
visual distortion. Specifically, we find that with enough strength, each attack is able to achieve near
100% ASR against the joint detectors.
In Figure 1, non-targeted MNIST adversarial examples generated by EAD are shown at κ =
{10, 20, 30}. In Figure 2, non-targeted CIFAR-10 adversarial examples generated by EAD are
shown at κ = {10, 30, 50}. Adversarial examples generated in the least-likely targeted case are
provided in the supplementary material, These figures indicate that adversarial examples generated
by EAD at high κ, which bypass the joint feature squeezing detector, have minimal visual distortion.
This holds true for adversarial examples generated by I-FGSM with high  on CIFAR-10, but not on
MNIST.
4 CONCLUSION
Feature Squeezing is a recently proposed class of input transformations which when combined in
a joint detection framework has been shown to achieve high detection rates against state-of-the-art
attacks. We show on the MNIST and CIFAR-10 datasets that by increasing the adversary strength,
by tuning the confidence κ and L∞ constraint  for EAD and I-FGSM, respectively, the proposed
joint detection configuration can be bypassed with adversarial examples of minimal visual distortion.
These results suggest for proposed defenses to validate against stronger attack configurations, using
the maximal adversary strength where examples remain visually similar to the inputs. For future
work, we aim to validate if other recently proposed defenses are robust to strong adversaries.
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Figure 3: Randomly selected set of least-
likely targeted MNIST adversarial examples
generated by EAD. First row: Original, Sub-
sequent rows: κ = {10, 20, 30}.
Figure 4: Randomly selected set of least-
likely targeted CIFAR-10 adversarial exam-
ples generated by EAD. First row: Original,
Subsequent rows: κ = {10, 30, 50}.
5 SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIAL
5.1 ATTACK DETAILS
The targeted attack formulations are discussed below, non-targeted attacks can be implemented in
a similar fashion. We denote by x0 and x the original and adversarial examples, respectively, and
denote by t the target class to attack.
5.1.1 EAD
EAD generalizes the state-of-the-art C&W L2 attack Carlini & Wagner (2017) by performing elastic-
net regularization, linearly combining the L1 and L2 penalty functions Chen et al. (2017). The
formulation is as follows:
minimizex c · f(x, t) + β‖x− x0‖1 + ‖x− x0‖22
subject to x ∈ [0, 1]p, (1)
where f(x, t) is defined as:
f(x, t) = max{max
j 6=t
[Logit(x)]j − [Logit(x)]t,−κ}, (2)
By increasing β, one trades off L2 minimization for L1 minimization. When β is set to 0, EAD is
equivalent to the C&W L2 attack. By increasing κ, one increases the necessary margin between
the predicted probability of the target class and that of the rest. Therefore, increasing κ improves
adversary strength but compromises visual quality.
We implement 9 binary search steps on the regularization parameter c (starting from 0.001) and run
I = 1000 iterations for each step with the initial learning rate α0 = 0.01. For finding successful
adversarial examples, we use the ADAM optimizer for the C&W attack and implement the projected
FISTA algorithm with the square-root decaying learning rate for EAD Kingma & Ba (2014); Beck &
Teboulle (2009).
5.1.2 I-FGSM
Fast gradient methods (FGM) use the gradient ∇J of the training loss J with respect to x0 for
crafting adversarial examples Goodfellow et al. (2015). For L∞ attacks, which we will consider, x is
crafted by
x = x0 −  · sign(∇J(x0, t)), (3)
where  specifies the L∞ distortion between x and x0, and sign(∇J) takes the sign of the gradient.
I-FGSM iteratively uses FGM with a finer distortion, followed by an -ball clipping Kurakin et al.
(2016). 10 steps are used, and the step-size was set to be /10, which has been shown to be an
effective attack setting in Tramèr et al. (2017).
5.2 EAD ADVERSARIAL EXAMPLES IN THE TARGETED CASE (FIGURES 3 AND 4)
In Figure 3, least-likely targeted MNIST adversarial examples generated by EAD are shown at
κ = {10, 20, 30}. In Figure 4, least-likely targeted CIFAR-10 adversarial examples generated by
5
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Figure 5: Randomly selected set of non-
targeted MNIST adversarial examples gen-
erated by I-FGSM.
First row: Original, Subsequent rows:  =
{0.3, 0.4, 0.5, 0.6, 0.7, 0.8.0.9, 1.0}.
Figure 6: Randomly selected set of non-
targeted CIFAR-10 adversarial examples gen-
erated by I-FGSM.
First row: Original, Subsequent rows:  =
{0.008, 0.04, 0.07, 0.1, 0.2, 0.3, 0.4, 0.5}.
EAD are shown at κ = {10, 30, 50}. Distortion is more apparent in the targeted case, particularly in
the least-likely targeted case, but the examples are still visually adversarial.
5.3 I-FGSM ADVERSARIAL EXAMPLES IN THE NON-TARGETED CASE (FIGURES 5 AND 6)
In Figure 5, non-targeted MNIST adversarial examples generated by I-FGSM are shown at
 = {0.3, 0.4, 0.5, 0.6, 0.7, 0.8.0.9, 1.0}. In Figure 6, non-targeted CIFAR-10 adversarial exam-
ples generated by I-FGSM are shown at  = {0.008, 0.04, 0.07, 0.1, 0.2, 0.3, 0.4, 0.5}. CIFAR-10
adversarial examples at high  have minimal visual distortion, however MNIST examples at high ,
which yield the optimal ASR, have clear distortion.
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